

## Message Text

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TO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 162357

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 162357 SENT SAIGON DATED JUL 25.

QUOTE

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E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: VS, EAID, PFOR  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MARTIN'S REMARKS BEFORE SFRC

FOR LEHMANN FROM WENZEL

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF PREPARED REMARKS WHICH AMBASSADOR  
MADE BEFORE SFRC JULY 25. AMBASSADOR REQUESTS THAT YOU  
DELIVER COPIES SOONEST TO PRIMIN KHIEM AND FONMIN BAC.

2. BEGIN TEXT. MR. CHAIRMAN: I VERY MUCH WELCOME THE  
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT TO THIS COMMITTEE SOME IMPRESSIONS  
OF THE VERY GREAT CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE  
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM SINCE MY ARRIVAL THERE A YEAR AGO  
THIS WEEK. IT HAS BEEN AN INTERESTING YEAR, IN MANY WAYS  
A FASCINATING YEAR AND, IN A FEW WAYS, A FRUSTRATING YEAR.

3. BUT IT HAS ALSO BEEN A REWARDING YEAR, BECAUSE I AM  
ABLE TO REPORT TO YOU THAT IF THE LEVEL OF ECONOMIC  
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ASSISTANCE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM RECOMMENDED AND  
URGED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER IS AUTHORIZED AND APPROPRIATED  
BY THE CONGRESS WE CAN CONFIDENTLY ANTICIPATE THAT IN A  
VERY FEW YEARS WE WILL BE ABLE TO REGARD OUR VIETNAM

INVOLVEMENT AS CLOSED. IF THE SECRETARY'S RECOMMENDATIONS ARE HEeded OUR INVOLVEMENT WILL BE CLOSED IN THE WAY THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF AMERICANS QUITE OBVIOUSLY WANT IT CLOSED - LEAVING THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ECONOMICALLY VIABLE, MILITARILY CAPABLE OF DEFENDING ITSELF WITH ITS

OWN MANPOWER AGAINST BOTH EXTERNAL AGGRESSION AND EXTERNALLY SUPPORTED INTERNAL SUBVERSION, AND FREE TO CHOOSE ITS OWN LEADERS AND ITS OWN GOVERNMENT AS ITS CITIZENS THEMSELVES MAY FREELY DETERMINE.

4. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THIS IS THE WAY WE WILL EVENT- UALLY LEAVE. IF THE REQUESTED LEVEL IS NOT FORTHCOMING IT WILL JUST TAKE US LONGER. FOR MY PART, I DEEPLY BELIEVE THE QUICKER WE REACH THIS GOAL, THE BETTER OFF WE WILL BE. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON I HAD PUBLICLY SUGGESTED THAT THE APPROPRIATE ECONOMIC AID LEVEL FOR THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FOR FY 1975 SHOULD BE \$850 MILLION RATHER THAN THE \$750 MILLION FINALLY RECOMMENDED BY THE ADMINISTRATION. ALTHOUGH I STILL THINK THE \$850 MILLION LEVEL WOULD PERMIT US TO MORE QUICKLY LEAVE VIETNAM, I REGRETFULLY CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS SMALL CHANCE OF MY PERSUADING YOU TO RAISE THE ADMINIST- RATION'S REQUESTED \$750 MILLION TO THAT LEVEL. ONE SENIOR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE DID OBSERVE THAT IF WE COULD HAVE GOTTEN A MAJORITY OF THE CONGRESS TO VISIT VIETNAM THIS YEAR AND SEE FOR THEMSELVES THE ACTUAL CURRENT REALITIES, WE WOULD HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN GETTING A CLEAR MAJORITY FOR \$900 MILLION. TO MY GREAT REGRET THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO VISIT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IN THE PAST YEAR.

5. I THINK IT VERY IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT WHAT WE ARE REQUESTING IS LESS THAN THREE-FOURTHS OF THE AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC AID WHICH WILL BE FURNISHED TO NORTH VIETNAM THIS YEAR BY THE PRC, AND THE SOVIET UNCLASSIFIED

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BLOC. OUR PRESENT ESTIMATE INDICATES THAT MORE THAN \$1.2 BILLION IN PURELY ECONOMIC AID WILL BE DELIVERED TO NORTH VIETNAM IN THIS CALENDAR YEAR.

6. PERHAPS IT WOULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO PERSPECTIVE TO RECALL THAT WHEN THE PARIS AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED IN JANUARY 1973, NO ONE WHO WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE COMPLEXITY AND DEPTH OF EMOTION INVOLVED IN THE VIETNAM PROBLEM EXPECTED A PERFECT PEACE OVERNIGHT. HOWEVER, THERE WAS A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT THE AGREEMENT PROVIDED A GOOD FRAMEWORK ON WHICH PEACE COULD BE BUILT, AND THERE WAS WIDESPREAD HOPE THAT THIS PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED IN A REASONABLE PERIOD

OF TIME.

7. IN THE SUBSEQUENT 18 MONTHS, HOWEVER, IT HAS  
BECOME INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE IS

NOT YET REALLY SERIOUS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING THE  
AGREEMENT. INSTEAD, THE AGING HANOI LEADERS ARE STILL  
TRYING TO SEIZE FULL POWER IN THE SOUTH THROUGH A  
COMBINATION OF MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC  
PRESSURE. THEY ARE ALSO ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE A  
CUT-BACK IN U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE  
TO THE SOUTH, WHICH THEY HOPE WOULD ACCELERATE THE  
COLLAPSE OF THE STRUCTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOCIETY  
WHICH THEIR DOCTRINE AND IDEOLOGY PREDICTED AS  
INEVITABLE WITH THE DEPARTURE OF AMERICAN ARMED  
FORCES. BUT THIS COLLAPSE HAS NOT HAPPENED, MR.  
CHAIRMAN, AND I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WILL NOT HAPPEN.  
TO DOCUMENT THIS CONVICTION, LET ME EXAMINE BRIEFLY  
THE CURRENT POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC SITUATION  
IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

8. POLITICALLY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS  
STRONGER THAN EVER. IT IS EFFECTIVE. IT EXERCISES  
NORMAL GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OVER MORE THAN 90 OF  
THE POPULATION AND ALL IMPORTANT TOWNS AND ECONOMICALLY  
PRODUCTIVE AREAS. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, IT IS PERCEIVED  
TO BE LEGITIMATE BY THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE SOUTH  
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, AND IT HAS THEIR FULL SUPPORT IN  
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ITS CONTINUING STRUGGLE WITH THE COMMUNISTS. IN  
SHARP CONTRAST, THE COMMUNISTS ARE POLITICALLY WEAKER  
THAN EVER, WITH CONTROL OVER LESS THAN ONE PERCENT  
OF THE POPULATION, AND VERY LITTLE POPULAR SUPPORT.

9. MILITARILY, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARE ALSO STRONG.  
THEIR ARMED FORCES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR ABILITY  
TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY BY STOPPING THE 1972 NORTH VIETNAME  
OFFENSIVE WITHOUT U.S. GROUND SUPPORT, AND BY  
MAINTAINING THE MILITARY STATUS QUO SINCE THE SIGNING  
OF THE AGREEMENT, IN SPITE OF SERIOUS ENEMY ATTACKS,  
WITHOUT ANY U.S. COMBAT HELP OR ADVICE. EVEN WITH  
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY BUILD-UP SINCE THE  
AGREEMENT, I AM CONFIDENT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CAN  
CONTINUE TO HANDLE THE MILITARY THREAT ON THEIR OWN,  
PROVIDED WE CONTINUE TO REPLACE MILITARY SUPPLIES ON  
THE PERMITTED ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS.

10. ECONOMICALLY, HOWEVER, SOUTH VIETNAM HAS SERIOUS  
PROBLEMS. THE ECONOMIC DECLINE OF THE PAST TWO YEARS  
WAS INITIATED BY THE 1972 NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE  
AND THE DISRUPTION AND REFUGEE BURDEN IT CREATED. IT

WAS EXACERBATED BY THE SHARP DECLINE IN THE VALUE OF  
OVERALL U.S. AID AND ECONOMIC INPUTS. AND IT HAS  
BEEN FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY RAPID INCREASES IN THE  
PRICE OF THE MAJOR SOUTH VIETNAMESE IMPORTS, WHICH

CONSIST PRIMARILY OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, FERTILIZER,  
AND FOODSTUFFS.

11. THE IMMEDIATE, SHORT-RANGE ECONOMIC PICTURE MAY  
LOOK UNFAVORABLE, BUT ITS VERY SEVERITY HAS, UP  
TO THIS POINT, CONTRIBUTED TO THE POLITICAL UNITY,  
AS ALL VIETNAMESE HAVE TIGHTENED THEIR BELTS. THERE  
HAS BEEN NO PANIC, NO POLITICAL UNREST, BUT A STEADFAST,  
PERVASIVE DETERMINATION TO SURMOUNT THIS LATEST  
OBSTACLE TO THEIR GOAL OF A BETTER LIFE, IN FREEDOM,  
FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR CHILDREN. THEY HAVE  
LARGELY PRESERVED THE FREE ECONOMY AND HAVE PERMITTED TH  
THE NORMAL FORCES OF A MARKET ECONOMY TO WORK. THUS,  
WE FIND THE PRICE OF GASOLINE AT ABOUT \$1.62 A GALLON,  
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ONE OF THE HIGHEST IN THE WORLD. SINCE ALL  
IMPORTS THAT WERE NOT ABSOLUTELY

ESSENTIAL HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED, NEW AID WILL BE CHANNELED  
MORE THAN EVER BEFORE INTO DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT  
PROJECTS WHICH WILL INCREASE THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY  
AND CREATE MORE JOBS. SOUTH VIETNAM'S LONGER RANGE  
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, THEREFORE, ARE QUITE GOOD. IN FACT,  
ALL THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS ARE PRESENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM  
FOR AN ECONOMIC BREAKTHROUGH ALONG THE LINES ACHIEVED IN  
TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA, AND IN AN EVEN SHORTER TIME  
FRAME.

OVERCOMING THESE SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND  
HASTENING THE DAY OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY ARE THE IMMEDIATE  
OBJECTIVES OF OUR FY-1975 ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROPOSALS  
FOR SOUTH VIETNAM. PERHAPS OF EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE  
ARE THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THESE  
PROPOSALS. I SHALL ALLUDE TO THESE A BIT LATER.

ON THE PURELY ECONOMIC SIDE, WE SHOULD NOTE THAT FOR  
THE PAST DECADE OUR ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED ON  
A STABILIZATION EFFORT, DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO HELP THE  
SOUTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT THE WAR EFFORT AND MEET WAR-  
RELATED CONTINGENCIES SUCH AS CARING FOR WAR VICTIMS.  
WARTIME CONDITIONS AND PRIORITIES FORCED THE NEGLECT OF  
LONGER RANGE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. THE  
SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE HAD SOME SUCCESS DURING THE PAST  
YEAR IN PLACING MORE EMPHASIS ON THE ECONOMIC FUTURE  
RATHER THAN THE PRESENT. THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT  
HAS RESPONDED TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN PART BY -ELIMINA-

TING ALL UNNECESSARY IMPORTS, AND ALL U.S. AID-FINANCED IMPORTS HAVE BECOME PRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT ORIENTED. NOW, WITH OUR FY-1975 REQUEST, WE HOPE TO PUT STILL GREATER EMPHASIS ON LONGER RANGE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS SO THAT THE SOUGH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY CAN MOVE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TOWARD SELF-SUFFICIENCY. IF THE AMOUNTS OF ASSISTANCE ENVISAGED IN THE PROJECTIONS GIVEN THE COMMITTEE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER CAN BE PROVIDED, I AM CERTAIN THAT AT THE END OF THIS DECADE SOUTH VIETNAM WILL NEED NO MORE THAN NOMINAL AMOUNTS OF UNCLASSIFIED

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FURTHER U.S. ECONOMIC AID.

IF WE HAVE THE WISDOM AND FORESIGHT TO MAKE THE LARGE INITIAL INVESTMENT IN ECONOMIC AID I AVE RECOMMENDED FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS, FY-75 AND FY-76, I AM COMPLETELY CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN REACH THIS GOAL MUCH SOONER. WHILE THE FY-1975 EMPHASIS ON DEVELOPMENT WILL BE SOMEWHAT MORE EXPENSIVE INITIALLY, WITHOUT IT SOUTH VIETNAM'S IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROGRAM WOULD BE DELAYED, ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY WOULD REMAIN A MIRAGE, AND THE

NEED FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE WOULD BE OPEN ENDED. ONE EXAMPLE PROVIDES A DRAMATIC ILLUSTRATION. THE FY-1975 PROPOSAL INCLUDES DOLS 80 MILLION FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A FERTILIZER PLANT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE SPENDING NEARLY DOLS 120 MILLION PER YEAR TO HELP THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE IMPORT THE FERTILIZER NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN FOOD PRODUCTION. YET, UNTIL THE FERTILIZER-PLANT IS BUILT, WE CANNOT CUT OFF FUNDS FOR FERTILIZER IMPORTS, SINCE TO DO SO WOULD CAUSE A SHARP DECLINE IN FOOD PRODUCTION AND THE CONSEQUENT PROSPECT OF EITHER FAMINE OR A MASSIVE U.S. FOOD SUPPLY PROGRAM. NEITHER ALTER-NATIVE WOULD APPEAR AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION.

THE PROGRAM REQUESTED CAN SERVE AS A SOUND BASIS FOR THE U.S. PHASE-DOWN EFFORT; AND IN THE LONG RUN IT WILL BE LESS COSTLY TO THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER THAN THE STABILIZATION PROGRAMS OF THE WARTIME PERIOD.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS TWO PARTICULAR QUESTIONS WHICH I KNOW HAVE BEEN OF CONCERN TO A GOOD MANY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

FIRST IS THE ASSERTION MADE FREQUENTLY IN RECENT MONTHS THAT ELIMINATING OR SHARPLY CUTTING OUR AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BRING PEACE BY FORCING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT. THIS MAY BE TRUE IF THE KIND OF PEACE DESIRED IS THAT OF ABJECT SURRENDER TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION, OR THE PEACE WHICH WOULD FOLLOW A BLOODY COMMUNIST MILITARY VICTORY. BUT THIS IS NOT THE KIND OF

PEACE FOR WHICH WE HAVE INVESTED SO MUCH ALL THESE YEARS,  
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NOR THE KIND OF PEACE WHICH WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST OR  
IN THE INTEREST OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. IN  
FACT, IT HAS NOT BEEN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT  
WHICH HAS BEEN BLOCKING IMPLEMENTATION OR THE PARIS  
AGREEMENT AND FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE. IT IS THE  
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM WHICH HAS EVERYTHING TO GAIN BY A  
FULL, COMPLETE AND RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS  
AGREEMENTS. PLAIN LOGIC MAKES THIS CONCLUSION INESCAPABLE.  
IT IS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO DO NOT DARE THE IMPARTIAL  
INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED REJECTION OF THEIR CLAIMS  
THAT THEY HAVE MORE THAN MINIMAL SUPPORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM  
WHICH WOULD BE THE AUTOMATIC RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS  
REQUIRED BY THE PARIS AGREEMENTS. CONSEQUENTLY, SHORT  
OF THE PATENTLY IMPOSSIBLE ATTEMPT TO FORCE THEIR  
SURRENDER OR MILITARY DEFEAT, THERE IS NO WAY WE CAN  
PRESSURE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ALONE TO MAKE A REAL PEACE.  
THE BEST HOPE FOR A GENUINE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND  
EVENTUAL RECONCILIATION IN VIETNAM IS TO MAINTAIN THE

BALANCE OF FORCES, BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC, WHICH HAS  
PERMITTED THE PROGRESS MADE THUS FAR.

SECONDLY, I AM AWARE OF THE ARGUMENT THAT IS BEING MADE  
THAT IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING HOSTILITIES IT MIGHT NOT  
BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMIC SELF-  
SUFFICIENCY IN A REASONABLE TIME FRAME, NO MATTER HOW  
MUCH AID WE GIVE.

I UNDERSTAND THE ARGUMENT. IT HAS A CERTAIN LOGIC.  
CAUTIOUS BUREAUCRATS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAVE BEEN  
USING IT FOR YEARS. IT STILL RANKLES ME THAT I WAS  
UNABLE TO PREVAIL OVER IT SOME YEARS AGO BEFORE I LEFT  
SOUTHEAST ASIA IN 1967. IT WAS A MISTAKE THEN. IT WILL  
BE AN EVEN GREATER MISTAKE NOW. BUT IT OVERLOOKS THE  
NEW FACTORS THAT, ONE, THERE IS NOW NO POSSIBLE WAY HANOI  
CAN OVERTHROW SAIGON BY ANY VARIATION OF A FAIR POLITICAL  
CONTEST, AND, TWO, IT IS NOW CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT NORTH  
VIETNAMESE CANNOT CONQUER SOUTH VIETNAM MILITARILY.  
THEIR LAST HOPE, THEREFORE, IS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A  
REDUCTION OF ECONOMIC AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM THAT IT WILL  
EFFECT THE POLITICAL UNITY AND THE MILITARY MORALE AND  
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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES.  
IF WE DO NOT PERMIT THIS TO HAPPEN, IF WE PROVIDE THE  
FULL AMOUNT SECRETARY KISSINGER HAS RECOMMENDED, WE CAN  
CONFIDENTLY ANTICIPATE A CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION IN THE

LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND, PERHAPS,  
PROGRESS TOWARD A REAL SETTLEMENT.

I STRONGLY BELIEVE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT WE SHOULD END AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM, AND WE SHOULD END IT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HOW WE END IT, HOWEVER, IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE. I BELIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO END IT LEAVING A SOUTH VIETNAM ECONOMICALLY VIABLE, MILITARILY CAPABLE OF DEFENDING ITSELF, FREE TO CHOOSE ITS OWN GOVERNMENT AND ITS OWN LEADERS, AND ABLE TO WORK OUT ITS OWN EVENTUAL RECONCILIATION WITH ITS ENEMIES IN THE NORTH. MOREOVER, I BELIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THE TIME FRAME WE HAVE PROJECTED. WHETHER OR NOT WE ARE ABLE TO WALK AWAY FROM SUCH A SOUTH VIETNAM AS I HAVE DESCRIBED, WITH THE EVIDENCE OF AMERICAN COMMITMENTS FULLY DISCHARGED, MAY WELL HAVE A DECISIVE IMPACT ON OUR FUTURE ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, AND ON OUR ABILITY TO HELP BUILD A WORLDWIDE STRUCTURE OF PEACE FOR OUR CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN. I DEEPLY BELIEVE THIS TO BE TRUE, MR. CHAIRMAN, AS SECRETARY KISSINGER EXPRESSED MUCH MORE ELOQUENTLY IN HIS STATEMENT TO THIS COMMITTEE ON JUNE 7.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM, OF COURSE, AVAILABLE TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS. INGERSOLL  
UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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